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1 Introduction
This paper develops a theory of holdout based on the landowners’ inabil-
ity to manage large sums of money and consequent lack of consumption
smoothing. In so doing we provide a theory of holdout that is complemen-
tary to the strategic bargaining approach to holdout (discussed later). We
demonstrate that this approach provides important insights regarding the
link between fragmentation and the landowners relative willingness to sale,
as well as the effects of political interventions. Interestingly, we find that
the efficiency implications of political intervention, as well as the possibil-
ity of such interventions depends on a subtle interaction of voice, collective
bargaining and the severity of fragmentation.
While the traditional approach to industrialization, e.g. Lewis (1954),
emphasizes the role of capital and labor for industrialization, the importance
of land is gradually being realized. This is true of all countries, land-poor,
as well as land rich, since industrialization requires land with good connec-
tivity, infrastructure, etc. which are quite likely to have alternative uses, in
particular for cultivation, and as homestead.1
It is therefore something of a concern that land acquisition for develop-
ment is often problematic, especially in less developed countries (henceforth
LDCs). In fact, as of now, delays in land acquisition for industrial projects
are threatening investments worth USD 100 billion all over India in near
term, according to an ASSOCHAM Eco Pulse Study entitled “Land acqui-
sition scenario in India.”2
1For example in West Bengal, India, the backdrop of some recent agitations over land
acquisition, most of the better infrastructure are in areas where land is fertile (Banerjee
et al. (2007)).
2Please see, http://www.commodityonline.com/news/The-cost-of-land-acquisition-
delays-in-India-$-82-bn-21747-3-1.html. The study states that according to an assessment
report released by the Indian Steel Ministry, 22 major steel projects in the country worth
USD 82 billion are being held up because of several reasons, including public protests.
Even in China, in 2005 alone there were over 60,000 local disturbances provoked by at-
tempts at acquiring agricultural land (Banerjee et al. (2007)). In fact many countries,
1
One of our motivating examples comes from West Bengal, India, where
the state government used the Land Acquisitions Act, 1894, to acquire 997
acres of land for building an automobile factory for Nano (the one lakh
rupee car) in Singur. This led to widespread protests and ultimately the
project had to be scrapped (see, e.g. Sarkar (2007) and Ghatak and Ban-
nerji (2009)). There are several other instances of agitations against land
acquisition in India in the recent years, often involving extra-legal means of
protests, and sometimes even violence.3
In the literature, such ex post problem with transactions is often referred
to as holdout.4 Given that land can, in general, be expected to have higher
value under industrial use, holdout seems to run counter to the Coase the-
orem. While the literature has mostly focused on the strategic bargaining
approach, here we seek to provide an explanation based on the fact that
managing large sums of money is problematic for landowners from LDCs
(see, e.g. Banerjee et al. (2007)). Such problems with managing lump sum
amounts arises out of the interaction of several factors, (a) missing markets,
in particular appropriate savings and insurance instruments,5 (b) lack of
complementary assets like skill and knowledge, and (c) exogenous income
and consumption shocks (see, e.g. Ghatak and Bannerji (2009)).6 Hence
including the USA, have promulgated eminent domain laws (that allow land acquisition for
public purposes on payment of compensation), presumably to counter problems associated
with land acquisition.
3Such protests took place against land acquisition by the West Bengal government in
Nandigram for building a chemical hub (Banerjee et al. (2007)), by the Orissa government
for building a steel plant by Posco (Chandra (2007)), by the Jharkhand government for
building a steel plant and also a power project in Khuntia district (12,000 acres, see Basu
(2008)), by the Himachal Pradesh government for building an international airport along
with air cargo hub at Gagret in Una district (11,500 acres, see Panwar (2008)), etc.
4See, for example, Cai (2000, 2003) and Benson (2005), among many others.
5Farmers hardly have any access to deposits that are inflation linked, one of their
primary concerns.
6Ghatak and Bannerji (2009) argues that the fact sale price of land may be high “is
driven by the absence of good insurance mechanisms and financial instruments, and low
levels of human capital, all of which make switching to alternative occupations costly.”
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land, which yields a steady stream of income over the future, is preferred to
having its present discounted worth as a lump-sum payment.
This argument is clearly related to the use-value approach which argues
that value of land to its owner, exceeds what follows from productivity
calculations. While there can be many different reasons for such divergence
(including sociological ones that claim that land is special, especially for
agriculturists),7 the inability to manage the large sums of money obtained
as compensation is one. Sarkar (2007), for example, suggests that such a
divergence can arise since once the land-owner sells her land, she will have
little alternative use for her labor. Mookherjee (1997) on the other hand
focuses on credit market imperfections coupled with productivity shocks.
For ease of exposition we shall call our approach the use-value approach,
though calling it a sale-value approach may be more accurate.
In this context it is instructive to examine what happened in the 1990s
in Kharagpur, West Bengal, India in the wake of land acquisition by the
government for setting up pig-iron factories. Guha (2007) reports that the
households receiving compensation for handing over land to Tata Metaliks
Limited (TML), mostly used the money for consumption, marriage and
house building purposes, and to a much lesser extent for bank deposits and
investments.8 Turning to anecdotal evidence, Guha (2007) mentions Nirod
Chowdhury who used up the compensation money for marriage purposes,
and was, at the time of writing, subsisting as agricultural daily laborer.9
7Even economists, for example the physiocrats in 18th century France, claimed a special
place for land among factors of production.
8According to Guha (2007), out of the households receiving compensation for TML
acquisition, 43.1% spent at least a part of compensation money on domestic consumption,
21.5% on marriage purposes and 28% for house-building and or repair. While about 40.3%
put it in bank deposits, and only about 13.9% used it for buying land elsewhere, or in
investments (shallow tube-wells).
9Ghatak and Bannerji (2009) mention that farmers in Singur, India were worried that
in case of sale some of the compensation amount will be used up by their children for
buying motorcycles.
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In contrast Dhiren Chowdhury, who re-invested the compensation money in
land, has not yet taken up any non-agricultural job. In fact, the farmers
themselves seemed to realize that what was important was access to a steady
stream of income, as seen from the fact that one of the demands of the
peasants agitating against this acquisition was job for land.10
We next turn to formalizing the idea that because of market failures
and exogenous shocks, people prefer having staggered incomes over their
planning horizons, to having a single large sum of money. We adopt a re-
duced form approach, whereby this is captured as over-consumption by the
landowners following a sale of their land. It is natural to formalize this
idea as farmers having hyperbolic discounting, i.e. present biased prefer-
ences, which is what we do. While there appears to be enough evidence
showing that people do display hyperbolic preferences11 (which adds to the
robustness of our approach), we treat this as essentially a reduced form for-
malization, rather than any attempt to claim that holdout can be traced to
hyperbolic discounting.
We begin by considering a dynamic two period example with one buyer
facing n ≥ 2 identical landowners, where the efficient outcome involves im-
plementing the grand project in the first period. In order to abstract from
the issues already dealt with by the strategic approach, we assume that the
buyer has all the bargaining power, formalized as the buyer making take-it-
or-leave-it offers to the landowners in both the periods.
The landowners have hyperbolic preferences so that their consumption
pattern following a sale is going to be distorted. This however is suboptimal
for the landowners’ long term selves, which increases the use value of the
plot, and, for a large class of parameter values, can lead to holdout in the
10Further, in a subsequent agitation in the same area against acquisition of land for
Century Textile Company, the peasants demanded either job for land, or land for land
(see Guha (2007)).
11See, among others, Phelps and Pollack (1968), Laibson(1997), O’Donoghue and Rabin
(1999), and the references cited in these papers.
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form of a delay in reaching the efficient outcome. Further, in an effort to
reduce this use-value effect, the buyer may have an incentive to postpone
transactions even past the period when it is feasible. Thus the presence of
the use-value effect may trigger further inefficiency by the buyer. This is in
contrast to the strategic bargaining approach, where any inefficiency can be
traced to landowner interactions.
We then use this framework to examine if an increase in fragmentation
increases the chances for holdout or not. We show that this is true if and only
if richer households are relatively more willing to sell their plots. Further,
this will be the case whenever the relative risk aversion is not too large.
These results have some interesting implications, suggesting, for example,
that the land reform program undertaken in West Bengal, India, may have
worsened the holdout problem by increasing fragmentation.
We then turn to a study of the effects of possible politicization of the
process of land acquisition. This is motivated by the fact that in several
recent instances of land acquisition in India, including Singur and Nandi-
gram in West Bengal, and Posco in Orissa, the process of land acquisition
became heavily politicized, with political parties, NGOs, as well as the civil
society getting involved in the debate. It may be argued that this is only
natural given that land acquisition is an emotive issue, especially in an LDC
context since, in the absence of proper rehabilitation, it can lead to serious
humanitarian tragedies.12
We begin by examining the possible efficiency implications of such politi-
cization. Conceptually, the effects of politicization can be of two kinds, voice,
i.e. the landowners getting a greater say in the bargaining process, and col-
lective bargaining. Interestingly, the efficiency implications of politicization
is linked to the extent of fragmentation, in the sense that voice coupled
with collective bargaining increases efficiency provided the landowners are
12Fernandez (2007), for example, argues that over the period 1947-2000, as many as 60
million persons were displaced for various development projects, many of whom were not
properly rehabilitated.
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relatively small, but not otherwise. The efficiency implications of voice is
ambiguous. This is of interest given that the strategic bargaining approach
suggests that an increase in voice, by increasing the bargaining power of the
landowners, can only worsen the holdout problem.
Interestingly, it appears land acquisition does not always lead to political
interventions. For example while in West Bengal, land acquisition in both
Singur and Nandigram led to serious political complications, the earlier land
acquisition in Kharagpur for pig-iron factories did not lead to any political
involvement (Guha (2007)).13 In fact, even at the time the Singur agitation
was going on, the Jindal group of companies managed to acquire land for
their factory in West Bengal without any political intervention.14 Further,
in certain states of India like Gujarat, land acquisition, even in the absence
of government intervention, seems relatively trouble free.15
Our analysis suggests that the extent of political intervention is linked to
whether landowners are already politically mature. We find that in the ab-
sence of voice, existing members of a landowner coalition may be unwilling
to admit more members. This follows since, with a smaller coalition size,
more landowners can be pushed down to their reservation payoff and more-
over, the surplus so generated can be transferred to the existing coalition
members. In that case political parties, who are more interested in increas-
ing their vote-bank, may have little incentive for getting involved. Further,
in case intervention does take place, party size may not be too large. The
result however may be reversed in case the landowners already have voice.
In this case with a less than inclusive party, the landowners who are out-
13In case of Singur and Nandigram it may be argued that the political payoff from
involvement, in the form of an expected increase in rural votes in the coming assembly
elections in West Bengal in 2011, was incentive enough.
14A PTI report dated July 16, 2007, mentioned that the West Bengal government has
finalized the land rates for JSW Bengal Steel’s 10 million tonne integrated steel plant at
Salboni in Midnapore district. See, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-166468250.html
15See, http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/land-acquisition-in-gujarat-less-
bloody/377151/
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side the party may appropriate the surplus given that they have voice. Thus
there is an incentive for inclusion, which in turn implies that political parties
may have an incentive to intervene.
1.1 Related Research
Formal treatments of the holdout problem have mostly focused on the strate-
gic approach, which builds on the idea that plots of lands constitute comple-
mentary assets, so that landowners who bargain later can extract a greater
share of the surplus. Consequently landowners have an incentive to wait
until others have already done so, so that inefficiencies, in the form of delay,
or the implementation of an inefficient project, is likely, e.g. Eckart (1985)
and Asami (1988). 16 The subsequent literature, in particular Cai (2000,
2003), Menezes and Pitchford (2004) and Roy Chowdhury and Sengupta
(2009), use infinite horizon bargaining models to analyze this issue. In Cai
(2000) and Menezes and Pitchford (2004) holdout takes the form of bar-
gaining delays, whereas in Cai (2003) it is manifested in the fact that as the
number of landowners becomes large, buyer payoff gets arbitrarily close to
zero. Roy Chowdhury and Sengupta (2009) on the other hand challenge the
traditional wisdom by showing that holdout is unlikely to be serious either
when the bargaining protocol is transparent (formalized as the buyer offers
being publicly observable), or when the complementarity is not too large.
Next turning to the use value approach, while in recent years this ap-
proach has been championed by several authors, including Banerjee et al.
(2007), Ghatak and Banerji (2009) and Sarkar (2007), to the best of our
knowledge there has been no serious attempts at formalizing it. The present
paper seeks to take this approach forward by providing a very simple formal-
ization of the idea, demonstrating, inter alia, that it can be used to address
several issues of interest.
16In the patents literature, Shapiro (2001), suggests that holdout arising out of bargain-
ing issues is a serious obstacle to R&D, and consequently long-run growth.
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Finally, Ghatak and Mookherjee (2009) uses a one buyer one landowner
model to analyze a holdup problem (i.e. one with ex ante inefficiency) associ-
ated with land transfer, as well as the issue of compensation. They however
do not examine the issue of ex post inefficiency.
Section 2 sets up the basic framework, examining the conditions for hold-
out, as well as the effects of fragmentation on holdout. Section 3 takes up the
issue of politicization, analyzing the efficiency effects of voice and collective
bargaining. Section 4 examines the issue of whether political intervention
at all occurs or not. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The Framework
There is a single buyer, who is interested in collecting n identical plots of
lands from n landowners, where n ≥ 2. These plots can be combined to
generate returns for the buyer. The grand project, where he manages to
buy up all the plots, yields a per period return of V to the buyer. However,
the project return for the buyer is zero in case he fails to collect all n plots.
The plots of lands also generate returns for the landowners in their current
use, yielding vn per period to each landowner. We assume that V > v > 0,
so that efficiency implies implementing the grand project.
We begin by considering a simple dynamic model of bargaining, where
the buyer and the landowners bargain over the price of the plots over two
periods. At the start of the second period, the set of ‘active’ landowners,
i.e. those who are yet to sell their objects, is common knowledge. Every
period is further sub-divided into four stages. Consider any period t:
Stage 1. The buyer makes an offer to all active landowners, with each
landowner only observing her component of the offer.17
Stage 2. The landowners simultaneously decide whether to accept the
17The buyer of course can always make a negative offer to any landowner that is sure
to be rejected by her.
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offers made to them or not.
Stage 3. The landowners simultaneously decide on their consumption
levels.
Stage 4. The buyer can exit and implement a project of size m, where
m denotes the number of plots collected to date. The buyer can also exit
the game without acquiring any plot of land.
Note that this formulation implies that the landowners have no bargain-
ing power. This is a modeling device that allows us to abstract from the
strategic bargaining issues that have been analyzed so far in the literature,
and focus on the use-value aspects.
The buyer has a time consistent risk neutral utility function, with a
discount factor of 1. The landowners’ utility functions display present bias
in consumption, formulated along the standard β − δ lines. Let u(c) denote
the per period utility from consuming c for all landowners.
Assumption 1 u(c) is twice differentiable, increasing, strictly concave,
u(0) = 0 and satisfies the Inada conditions.
Let Uik(c1, c2) represent the continuation utility of a landowner in stage
k of period i, when she consumes ci in period i. We assume that δ = 118
and β < 1, so the landowners’ utility is present biased. Then
U1k(c1, c2) = u(c1) + u(c2), k = 1, 2,
U1l(c1, c2) = u(c1) + βu(c2), l = 3, 4, (1)
U2m(c1, c2) = u(c2), m = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Our formulation is in line with O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), in that
in the pre-consumption stages, the consumer takes a long run view of her
utility. Thus her utility at these stages only depend on her consumption
vector (c1, c2) and is not subject to any present bias.
18The assumption that δ = 1 is for expositional reasons alone, and can be relaxed
without affecting the results qualitatively.
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We study subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies, the focus being
on the existence of efficient equilibria, i.e. in which the buyer implements
the grand project at t = 1.
2.1 The Analysis: Holdout
As is standard, we solve this game backwards, starting with period 2 first.
For ease of exposition, we have the tie-breaking rule that in case of indiffer-
ence, an agent prefers to accept an offer, rather than reject it.
Given that the reservation payoff of any active landowner in period 2 is
exactly vn , and the buyer makes a profit only if he manages to collect all the
plots, the following result is straightforward.
Observation 1 In period 2, the unique equilibrium involves the buyer
offering vn to the active landowners, all of whom agree.
We then turn to solving the game in period 1. Note that in stage 4, the
buyer never exits unless he has managed to acquire all the plots of land.
Next consider stage 3, when a landowner decides on her consumption c1.
First consider a landowner who is yet to sell her land. She has a current
income of v/n, and will obtain another v/n in the next period. Given that
her consumption is present-biased, she fully consumes her current income,
so that c1 = c2 = v/n.19 Thus the utility of such a landowner at stages 1
and 2 of period 1 is given by
U˜ = 2u(
v
n
). (2)
Consequently U˜ is the reservation utility of a landowner who refuses an offer
in period 1.
We then consider a landowner who has already sold her land for p, say.
She then selects her consumption vector so as to maximize u(c1)+βu(p−c1).
19Given that u(c) is strictly concave, for any c1 < v/n, u
′(c1) > βu′(c2), so that
increasing c1 leads to an increase in u(c1) + βu(c2).
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Therefore the optimal c1(p, β) involves
u′(c1) = βu′(p− c1). (3)
Given (3), we find that following the sale of her land in period 1, a landowner’s
consumption in period 1 exceeds that in period 2. This creates a distortion
since her long run self at the earlier stages of period 1 does not prefer such
a consumption pattern. Further, period 1 consumption, i.e. c1(p, β), is
increasing in her income, and decreasing in β. Thus straightforward calcu-
lation yields
Observation 2 (i) c1(p, β) = c2(p, β).
(ii) ∂c1(p,β)∂p =
βu′′(c2)
u′′(c1)+βu′′(c2) > 0,
∂c2(p,β)
∂p =
u′′(c1)
u′′(c1)+βu′′(c2) > 0 and
∂c1(p,β)
∂p +
∂c2(p,β)
∂p = 1.
(iii) ∂c1(p,β)∂β =
u′(c2)
u′′(c1)+βu′′(c2) < 0 and
∂c2(p,β)
∂β = − u
′(c1)
u′′(c1)+βu′′(c2) > 0.
Example. For u(c) =
√
c, note that c1(p, β) = p1+β2 and c2(p, β) =
β2p
1+β2
. Thus Observation 2 holds.
We then introduce the notion of use-value of land.
Definition. The use-value of a plot, v˜, is such that at t = 1 a landowner
is indifferent between selling her land for v˜, and not selling the land at all
(when her utility is U˜).
Recalling that U˜ is the reservation utility of a landowner in period 1, the
use-value v˜ solves
u(c1(v˜, β)) + u(v˜ − c1(v˜, β)) = U˜ , (4)
if a solution exists,20 otherwise we define v˜ =∞.
Let 2vn denote the present discounted value of the land. Proposition 1
below shows that the use value of land exceeds 2vn , formalizing the idea that
20Given that u(c1(v˜))+βu(c2(v˜)) is increasing in p, if a solution exists it must be unique.
11
the value of having land may not be adequately captured by the present
discounted value of v/n. The intuition follows from Observation 2(i), which
shows that with hyperbolic discounting sale of land leads to a distortion in
the consumption pattern, so that landowners need to be compensated over
and above the present discounted value of the land.
Proposition 1 (i) The use value of land, i.e. v˜, exceeds the present dis-
counted value of the land, i.e. 2v/n.
(ii) v˜ is decreasing in β.
Proof. (i) Suppose to the contrary v˜ ≤ 2vn . Observe that
u(c1) + u(c2) < 2u(v˜/2) ≤ U˜ , (5)
where the first inequality follows since, from strict concavity of u(c), maxi-
mizing u1(c) + u2(c) implies that v˜/2 should be consumed in both periods,
whereas from Observation 2(i), c1 6= c2. The second inequality follows since
v˜ ≤ 2vn . We note however that (5) contradicts the definition of v˜.
(ii) Totally differentiating (4), and using Observation 2,
dv˜
dβ
=
[u′(c2)− u′(c1)]∂c1(p,β)∂β
∂c1(v˜,β)
∂v˜ u
′(c1) +
∂c2(v˜,c2)
∂v˜ u
′(c2)
. (6)
The result now follows from Observation 2.
We are finally in a position to solve the game. Proposition 2 below shows
that an efficient equilibrium exists if and only if V − nv˜ + v ≥ 0, when the
outcome where the buyer makes an acceptable offer of v˜ to all the landowners
at t = 1, can be sustained as an equilibrium. Whereas if V − nv˜ + v < 0,
then no efficient equilibrium exists, with the unique equilibrium involving
the buyer making acceptable offers at t = 2, so that there is delay.
Proposition 2 If V − nv˜ + v ≥ 0, then the unique equilibrium involves
all the landowners selling their land for v˜ at t = 1. Otherwise, the unique
equilibrium involves the buyer acquiring all n plots at t = 2 for v/n each.
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Proof. Suppose that V − nv˜ + v ≥ 0. Consider the strategies where
at t = 1 the buyer offers v˜ to all landowners, and a landowner accepts an
offer if and only if she obtains at least v˜. The strategies in period 2 follow
Observation 1. Given that v˜ constitutes a landowner’s reservation payoff,
the landowners’ strategies at t = 1 are optimal. Next consider the buyer’s
strategy. Given that 2V ≥ nv˜, the buyer has a non-negative payoff. Further,
given that V V −nv˜+v ≥ 0, the buyers payoff from implementing the project
at t = 1, exceeds that from implementing it at t = 2. Hence these strategies
constitute the unique equilibrium for these parameter values. Whereas if
2V − v˜ ≥ 0, but 2V − nv˜ < V − v, then it is optimal for the buyer to reach
an agreement at t = 2. Finally, if V < nv˜, then making acceptable offers to
all landowners at t = 1 is loss making given that 2V < nv˜. Consequently,
the grand project is not implementable at t = 1, and acceptable offers can
only be made at t = 2. The result now follows from Observation 1.
Holdout, i.e. delay in Proposition 2, follows because sale of land leads
to a distortion in consumption pattern, thus pushing up use-value beyond
the present discounted value of v. Clearly, this is inefficient, so that we
have a violation of the Coase theorem despite there being no incomplete
information.
Further, if 2V − nv˜ ≥ 0, but 2V − nv˜ < V − v, then it is the buyer
who may have an incentive to delay bargaining, with an agreement being
reached at t = 2, even though an agreement at t = 1 is feasible. While, with
time, the project value from reaching an agreement decreases, the amount
payable to the landowners may decrease even faster, hence the delay. This
is in contrast to the bargaining logic so far explored in the literature, where
(any) inefficiency is essentially driven by the landowners.
Remark 1 For comparison, let us consider the case where the landown-
ers are time consistent so that β = 1. Note that in this case v˜ = 2v/n, so
that 2V − nv˜ = 2(V − v) > V − v. Thus from Proposition 2 the unique
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equilibrium involves the buyer offering 2v/n to all landowners, who accept.
Remark 2 It is clear that the holdout problem may be resolved in case the
buyer can make a credible offer to make staggered payments to the landown-
ers, e.g. v/n every period. The fact that such contracts are rarely seen in
practice may be because of commitment issues, e.g. if there is a chance that
the buyer may get bankrupt in the next period, rendering such contracts null
and void. Further, in the context of LDCs, the landowners are unlikely to
have the financial muscle required to enforce contracts against buyers who
may be large firms.21
In the rest of the paper we focus on the case where present bias is ex-
treme, i.e. β = 0. One benefit is analytical tractability since this has the
implication that all income will be consumed in the current period. Even
more importantly though, this crystalizes the notion that people may not be
that good in managing large sums of money, the primitive of our analysis.
Thus all our subsequent results follow from this primitive, rather than from
anything specific to the β − δ formulation.
2.2 Fragmentation and relative willingness to sale
We then put this model to work by examining two issues of interest, the
effect of increased fragmentation on holdout, and the relative willingness to
sale of bigger landlords vis-a-vis smaller ones. Interestingly, we find that the
answers to these questions are inter related.
It is commonly argued that increased fragmentation leads to greater
holdout, the idea being that with land being contiguous, fragmentation
21Interestingly, Ghatak and Bannerji (2009) report that when they asked landowners
in Singur, West Bengal (the proposed site for the Tata-Nano car) if they would prefer
a monthly payment, they said that they could not trust the buyers to keep their com-
mitment. Banerjee et al. (2007), in fact not only suggests compensation in the form of
monthly pensions with a savings bond, but also suggests the setting up of independent
regulatory authorities to take care of the commitment issue.
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makes plots that are centrally located extremely critical, increasing the
strategic incentives for holdout. While this is undoubtedly an important
insight, we demonstrate that the use-value effect can lead to the same re-
sult.
Turning to the question of relative willingness to sale, it is interest-
ing to note that Ghatak and Bannerji (2009) suggest that relatively larger
landowners are more willing to sale their plots.22 Formally, we say that a
larger landowner has a greater incentive to sale if the proportional willing-
ness to sale, i.e. v˜(v)−vv , is decreasing in v. We find that the answer to these
two questions are connected, so that fragmentation increases holdout if and
only if larger landowners are relatively more willing to sale.
Given that β = 0, in case of a sale, all consumption by the landowners
occur in period 1 itself. Thus v˜(n) solves
u(v˜(n)) = 2u(
v
n
). (7)
Totally differentiating and manipulating, we obtain
dv˜(n)
dn
= −2vu
′( vn)
n2u′(v˜)
. (8)
Turning to the effect of fragmentation, recall from Proposition 2 that
holdout occurs if and only if V −nv˜+v < 0. Thus we say that fragmentation
increases holdout whenever V − nv˜(n) + v is decreasing in n, i.e. nv˜(n) is
increasing in n. Observe that
d[nv˜(n)]
dn
=
v˜u′(v˜)− 2 vnu′(v/n)
u′(v˜)
. (9)
Consequently, fragmentation increases holdout if and only if v˜u′(v˜) −
2 vnu
′(v/n) > 0.
22For very large landowners however the effect may be reversed because of status effects,
see, e.g. Ghatak and Bannerji (2009).
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We then examine the effect of an increase in v on the proportional will-
ingness to pay. From (7), dv˜(v)dv =
2u′(v/n)
nu′(v˜) , so that
d[ v˜(v)−vv ]
dv
=
1
v2u′(v˜)
[2
v
n
u′(
v
n
)− v˜u′(v˜)]. (10)
Hence the landowners with larger v has a relatively greater willingness to
sale if and only if v˜u′(v˜) − 2 vnu′(v/n) > 0. Note that this is the same
as the condition that fragmentation increases holdout. This discussion is
summarized in Proposition 3 below.
Further, we show that fragmentation increases holdout (and hence will-
ingness to sale is increasing with v) whenever relative risk aversion is not
too large (and some additional technical conditions hold).
Proposition 3 (i) Fragmentation increases holdout if and only if larger
landowners have a relatively greater willingness to sale.
(ii) Let the relative risk aversion be less than one, i.e. −u
′′(x)
u′(x)/x < 1.
Then an increase in fragmentation increases the chances for holdout, i.e.
dnv˜(n)
dn > 0, whenever − u
′′′(x)
u′′(x)/x > 2 and limx→0 xu
′(x) ≥ 0.
Proof. (ii) Given that −u
′′(x)
u′(x)/x < 1, it follows that xu
′(x) is increasing
in x. Further, since − u′′′(x)u′′(x)/x ≤ 2, it follows that xu′(x) is weakly convex
in x. Next since xu′(x) is increasing (and v˜ > 2vn ), v˜u
′(v˜) > 2vn u
′(2v/n).
Further, since xu′(x) is weakly convex and limx→0 xu′(x) ≥ 0, 2vn u′(2v/n) ≥
2v
n u
′(v/n).
Note that the condition that relative risk aversion is not too large is
equivalent to the absolute risk aversion at x being less than 1/x, which, for x
small, may not be a very severe restriction. The condition that − u′′′(x)u′′(x)/x > 2
is not innocuous though, since, for u(c) =
√
c (which violates this condition),
fragmentation has no impact on holdout.
Proposition 3(i) has some interesting implications. For example, recall
the observation by Ghatak and Bannerji (2009) that in the Singur area
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richer landlords are relatively more willing to sale their land. But then from
Proposition 3, any further fragmentation would increase holdout. Thus,
if fragmentation increases with the passage of time (perhaps because of
population pressure), holdout in this area can only be expected to increase!23
Note however that the preceding discussion, which implicitly assumes
that average productivity of land is constant, ignores the literature on land
size and productivity. Clearly, if there is an optimal operational holding size
(see, e.g. Binswanger et al. (1995), pp. 2694-2707), then the analysis also
needs to take into account the effect of fragmentation on operational plot
size.
Remark 3 Interestingly, Eckart (1985) provides an alternative argument
based on the strategic bargaining approach as to why bigger landowners may
be more willing to sale. Larger the landowner, the greater is her impact
on total price and thus on the probability that the offer will be rejected.
Internalizing this fact, larger landowners charge relatively lower prices in
his framework.
Remark 4 We then consider an alternative formulation where the landown-
ers have a longer planning horizon compared to that of the buyer. It is easy
to show that Propositions 1-3 go through as long as the landowners have a
longer, but finite planning horizon. The more interesting case is when the
landowners have an infinite time horizon and a discount factor of δ < 1.
The rest of the game is as before. In this case the reservation payoff of a
landowner is given by v˜′ where
u(v˜′) =
u(v/n)
1− δ .
Further, for 2V < nv˜′, there is complete breakdown of transactions. Oth-
erwise, however the efficient outcome is reached at t = 1. Interestingly,
23Further, as argued by Ghatak and Bannerji (2009), the limited land reform in West
Bengal, India, may have, by increasing fragmentation, created a situation which is very
susceptible to holdout.
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the buyer does not have an incentive to delay an agreement (since the use-
value effect is constant across time). Further, as the rate of interest goes
to zero (so that δ goes to 1), v˜′ goes to infinity, so that holdout necessar-
ily happens. Further, it is straightforward to extend the argument to show
that an analogue of Proposition 3 goes through. We however feel that the
finite horizon framework is perhaps more appealing in the context of land
acquisition. This is for two reasons. First, even in LDCs the landowners do
not always see land as a hereditary occupation, anticipating (sometimes even
hoping), that their progeny would move on to non-agricultural occupations.
Second, land acquisition may take place in the backdrop of eminent domain,
so that landowners may fear that the government is going to step in unless
an agreement is reached soon.24
3 Politicization of the Landowners
We then turn to examining the effects of politicization of the process of land
acquisition. As argued in the introduction, while such politicization need
not always occur (and in Section 4 we shall later try to provide a reason as
to why this may be the case), clearly sometimes they do, and examining the
incentives for such interventions, as well as their efficiency implications are
of interest.
Consider a scenario with a political party which first decides whether to
participate in the land agitation or not. We shall model this aspect very
sketchily, and just say that the party has a bigger incentive to participate in
case more landowners are likely to join in case of involvement (so that there
is an increase in its vote-bank). In case of involvement, the party provides
two services, it gives its members voice (in case they do not already have
it), as well as the ability to bargain collectively with the buyer.
24In fact, the proposed modification to the Indian Land Acquisition Act has provisions
that states that the buyer may invoke eminent domain once it acquires a certain fraction
of the required plots.
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In this section we abstract from the participation decision, analyzing the
efficiency implications in case of participation. In order to clarify the role
of these two aspects, we however analyze these separately.
3.1 Voice
We first examine the efficiency implications of voice, formalized through a
bargaining game where landowners alone make the offers, so that they have
all the bargaining power. In order to focus on the effects of voice alone, we
begin by examining a scenario where the landowners, while having voice,
bargain individually.25
We examine a variation of the model in Section 2 where at t = 1, 2 all
the active landowners simultaneously make offers to the buyer, followed by
the buyer announcing his decisions as to which one of the offers he accepts,
which is followed by the landowners’ consumption decisions, and finally the
buyer’s exit decision.
Let t be the earliest instant when implementing the grand project is
feasible even after paying all the landowners their reservation prices. Thus
t = 1 if 2V ≥ nv˜, and t = 2 otherwise.
Let v˜(t) denote the reservation payoff of a landowner at t, so that v˜(1) =
v˜ and v˜(2) = v/n. We show that there is a multiplicity of equilibria, such
that any outcome where the grand project is being implemented at t, or
later, can be sustained as an equilibrium. In particular the second best
outcome, where an agreement is reached at t = t, can be sustained as an
equilibrium.
Proposition 4 For any t ≥ t, there is an equilibrium where the landowners
all ask for v˜(t) at t and the buyer accepts.
The proof of Proposition 4, as well as all subsequent propositions can be
found in the appendix.
25The case of collective bargaining is taken up in the next sub-section.
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Note that an equilibrium with landowner voice may or may not be ef-
ficient compared to that without voice. Suppose for example, that 0 <
2V − nv˜ < V − v, so that the equilibrium without voice involves delay
(Proposition 2), but with landowner voice an efficient equilibrium at t = 1
can be sustained. On the other hand, for 2V − nv˜ ≥ V − v the equilibrium
without voice involves the efficient outcome being implemented (Proposition
2), however with voice there may be delay!
Thus an increase in voice may, or may not increase efficiency. This is
essentially because of a standard coordination problem, leading to multiple
equilibria. Interestingly, the strategic approach to holdout suggests that
allowing for landowner offers would, by increasing the bargaining power of
the landowners, necessarily worsen the holdout problem.
3.2 Collective Bargaining with Voice
We then examine the case where all landowners join the party to form a
party C(n), consisting of all n landowners, that bargains collectively with
the objective of maximizing aggregate landowner utility.
We modify the game in the previous sub-section so that at t = 1, 2, the
party C(n) offers all the n plots in return for a price. The buyer responds
to this offer, either accepting it or not. In case this offer is accepted, the re-
ceived amount is equally distributed among all landowners. This is followed
by the landowners making their consumption decisions, and then the buyer
making his exit decision.
Turning to the analysis, note that the average utility of a party member
is 2u(v/n) in case there is no agreement, u(v/n) + u(V/n) in case of an
agreement at t = 2, and u(2V/n) in case of an agreement at t = 1. This
follows since the party, which has the bargaining power, will extract all the
surplus from the buyer. Further, given that V > v, reaching an agreement
at t = 2 is better than never reaching an agreement for the party.
Proposition 5 below shows that depending on the value of v relative to
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V , collective bargaining (with voice) may or may not improve efficiency.
Intuitively, for v large, the holdout problem is serious so that the buyer has
an incentive to wait, so as to reduce the use-value effect. Under collective
bargaining this delay cost can be avoided. Hence politicization improves
efficiency when v is low, not otherwise.
Proposition 5 There exists v such that for v ≥ v collective bargaining is
at least as efficient as bargaining without politicization. Further, there exists
v such that for v ≤ v bargaining without politicization is at least as efficient
as collective bargaining.
4 Political Intervention: When Does it Happen?
Finally, we seek to answer the question as to why land acquisition, despite
its obvious emotive appeal, is not always taken up by the political parties.26
Here we seek to provide an explanation based on the number of landowners
who have an incentive to join the party following such intervention, arguing
that this number is likely to be low in case the landowners are politically
immature (in the sense of having voice), and likely to be large otherwise.
Thus political parties will have a greater incentive to intervene when the
landowners already have voice.
Suppose m of the landowners, m < n, join the political party. Let us
denote this party by C(m). Thus there are n − m landowners who are
not part of any party, and bargain individually (we call them ‘individual’
landowners for ease of exposition). The objective of the party C(m) is to
maximize the average payoff of its members.
26Of course, depending on the context, there can be many different explanations. In
the Indian context, for example, one reason may be that the affected people are often the
tribal (Fernandez (2007)).
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4.1 Politically immature landowners
In case the individual landowners do not have voice, the game takes the
following form: at every t = 1, 2, C(m) makes an offer to the buyer regarding
the price of the m plots under its control, which the buyer can either accept,
or reject. Following this stage, the buyer makes offers to all the remaining
active individual landowners, who then simultaneously decide whether to
accept, or reject. This is followed, as before, by the landowners’ consumption
and then the buyer’s exit decisions.
Our next proposition shows that the average utility of the party is de-
creasing in party size. A smaller party size helps increase the surplus avail-
able to the buyer following an agreement with C(m) (this is also the surplus
that the party can extract for itself) since more landowners can now be
pushed down to their reservation payoffs.
Proposition 6 In case the individual landowners do not have voice, the
average utility of the party members is decreasing in party size.
Proposition 6 thus suggests that members of an existing party may not
be interested in inducting new members. Given that political involvement
may require some fixed costs for political parties, such involvement may not
be worthwhile as potential gains in terms of an increase in votes, or party
membership may be small.
4.2 Politically mature landowners
We then examine a somewhat different scenario where the landowners are
already politically mature, in the sense that they have voice. At every
t the game is as follows: C(m) makes an offer, followed by the buyer’s
accept/reject decision. This is followed by all the other active landowners
making their offers simultaneously. As usual, this is followed by the buyer’s
acceptance decisions, then the landowners’ consumption decision and the
buyer’s exit decision.
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Proposition 7 In case the landowners already have voice, for any C(m),
m < n, there is an equilibrium where no agreement is reached.
In such a scenario, the landowners may have an incentive to all join
a political party, when from Proposition 5 earlier, average landowner util-
ity is greater. Further, with larger memberships, political parties have a
greater incentive to participate. Combining Propositions 6 and 7 we have
the following
Corollary. In case the landowners are not politically mature (in the
sense of not having voice), political intervention is not very likely. Even if
it happens, not many landowner may join the party. In case landowners
already have voice, political intervention is more likely, which moreover is
accompanied by greater membership.
In this context it may be of interest to note that many of the political
interventions in India actually occurred in West Bengal, which, because of its
history of land reforms, can be said to be more politically mature compared
to many other Indian states.
5 Conclusion
This paper develops a theory of holdout, based on the landowners’ inabil-
ity to manage large sums of money and consequent lack of consumption
smoothing. This inability arises naturally in the presence of market failures
and exogenous shocks, both of which are reasonable in LDC contexts. Fur-
ther support for this framework can perhaps be garnered from the literature
on development induced displacement. This literature, e.g. Cernea (2000),
demonstrates that following such displacement, landowners often go into a
downward spiral in several aspects of their life, leading to joblessness, home-
lessness, food insecurity and increased morbidity and mortality. Along with
the reasons discussed by Cernea (2000), e.g. loss of access to common prop-
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erty and services, social disarticulation, etc., clearly the inability to manage
large sums of money can be another contributory factor.
We find that this formulation yields the prediction that fragmentation
increases holdout and moreover, this happens if and only if large landowners
are relatively more willing to sale. Further, in contrast to the strategic
bargaining literature, delay can be caused by the buyer. Turning to the
effect of politicization, voice coupled with collective bargaining increases
efficiency provided fragmentation is severe. Further, depending on whether
the landowners already have voice or not, political parties may, or may not
have an incentive to intervene in the process.
This paper of course only scratches the surface of what is clearly a very
complex issue, and can be extended in several directions. For one, in an effort
bring out the main points more clearly, this paper deliberately abstracts from
the issue of strategic holdout. We feel that a proper understanding of the
holdout problem in land acquisition requires an integration of both these
aspects and hope that such a synthesis is in the offing.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the following strategies. For any t′ 6= t,
the landowners all ask for 2V . At t all landowners ask for v˜(t). At any t′,
a buyer accepts all landowner offers if and only if accepting all such offers
leads to a non-negative payoff for the buyer.
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that v is large, but to the contrary
the grand project is implemented at t = 2 under collective bargaining, and
at t = 1 without politicization. Consider collective bargaining. Since an
agreement is reached at t = 2, u(2V/n) < u(v/n) + u(V/n) so that
u(2V/n)− u(V/n) < u(v/n) = u(v˜)− u(v/n). (11)
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Similarly, since without politicization, an agreement is reached at t = 1,
V/n ≥ v˜ − v/n. (12)
Combining the above two equations
u(2V/n)− u(V/n)
V/n
<
u(v˜)− u(v/n)
v˜ − v/n . (13)
Given the concavity of u(c), for v close to V , v˜ > 2V/n, so that this condition
is violated. Similarly, for v small, v˜ < V/n, so that an analogous argument
shows that politicization is relatively inefficient.
Proof of Proposition 6. Note that following an acceptable offer by C(m),
the buyer will offer the individual landowners their reservation payoff. Thus
the average utility of C(m) is
u(v˜ +
2V − nv˜
m
), (14)
in case an agreement is reached at t = 1, and
u(v/n) + u(
V − v
m
+ v/n), (15)
in case an agreement is reached at t = 2. Clearly, if an agreement is reached
at t = 1, then 2V ≥ nv˜. Thus the average payoff is decreasing in party size
m.
Proof of Proposition 7. Consider the following strategy profile. At any t,
C(m) asks for 2V (which is an unacceptable offer). The individual landown-
ers all ask for v˜(t). Given the strategies of the individual sellers, any ac-
ceptable offer by C(m) must ask for a price of zero from the buyer for the
n plots under its control. Thus it is optimal for C(m) to never make an
acceptable offer.
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